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Abstract
Accommodating asymmetric information in a dynamic asset pricing model is technically
challenging due to the problems associated with higher-order expectations. That is, rational
investors are forced into a situation where they must forecast the forecasts of other agents. In
a dynamic setting, this problem telescopes into the infinite future and the dimension of the
relevant state space approaches infinity. By using the frequency domain approach of Whiteman
(1983) and Kasa (2000), this paper demonstrates how information structures previously believed
to preserve asymmetric information in equilibrium, converge to a symmetric information, ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium. The revealing aspect of the price process lies in the invertibility
of the observed state space, which makes it possible for agents to infer the economically funda-
mental shocks and thus eliminating the need to forecast the forecasts of others.
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1 Introduction
Keynes (1936) likened investment decisions to beauty contests in which competitors had to select
the “prettiest faces” from a hundred photographs. Keynes argued that competitors will not pick
the faces they find most attractive but will be forced into a situation where they must guess
what average opinion expects the average opinion to be; that is, they must form higher-order
expectations. This scenario accurately describes the behavior of differentially informed investors
in a simple asset pricing model. Traders recognize that information disseminated through current
and past prices reflects not only the information endowment of other investors, but also their
attempts to forecast the forecasts of other traders. The goal of this paper is to explicitly model
how information is disseminated through prices, and to show when this dissemination becomes
too widespread to maintain asymmetric information in equilibrium. Models previously believed to
impose asymmetric information in equilibrium (e.g., Singleton (1987)) are shown to converge to
symmetric information, representative agent models.
The empirical failures of representative agent models have inspired a vast literature that in-
troduces information heterogeneity and higher-order expectations in hopes of reconciliating theory
with data.1 However, the computational problems associated with heterogeneous information have
long proven to be a significant impediment to solving dynamic, intertemporal trading models with
differentially informed investors. The crux of the problem is how to model higher-order expecta-
tions. Investors who anticipate what average opinion expects the average opinion to be form, what
Keynes called, third-degree expectations. Due to the complexities of the fourth degree, Phelps
(1983) quipped “one gets a vertiginous feeling, the eyes dull, and the face goes slack.” Yet in a
dynamic model, rational investors will fall into the trap of infinite regress where they must forecast
what the average opinion expects the average opinion expects the average opinion..., ad infinitum.
Agents behaving optimally must incorporate these infinite-order expectations into their beliefs, thus
making the state space infinite dimensional.
To circumvent the problem of infinite regress, existing models typically make simplifying as-
sumptions or cleverly construct the model to bypass infinite regress.2 Lucas (1975) was the first
to capture the technical formalities of infinite regress in expectations, yet neatly sidestepped the
problem by assuming traders got together each period and pooled their forecasts. Townsend (1983)
did not make this simplifying assumption and resorted to a truncation strategy, where the state of
the economy is revealed to all agents with a two-period lag. Singleton (1987) was the first to study
a dynamic asset pricing model with higher-order belief dynamics and also employed the truncation
1Recent contributions include Angeletos and Pavan (2005), Allen, Morris, and Shin (2005), Bacchetta and van
Wincoop (2004), Hellwig and Veldkamp (2005), Morris and Shin (2003), Nimark (2005), Ui (2003), and Woodford
(2003).
2Approaches to elude the problem of infinite regress have included: constructing a hierarchical information struc-
ture with limited dispersion of information (e.g., Wang (1994), Wang (1993)); assuming a continuum of investors and
invoking the law of large numbers to remove all aggregate uncertainty (e.g., He and Wang (1995)); assuming a finite
or static environment in which the asset is liquidated at a certain date (e.g., Allen, Morris, and Shin (2005), Foster
and Viswanathan (1996)).
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technique of Townsend to solve the model.3 In contrast, this paper does not assume away the
infinite-regress problem and demonstrates how frequency domain techniques can be used to solve
dynamic, asymmetric information models. Once an analytical solution to the model is derived, the
size of the approximation error associated with the popular truncation technique can be assessed.
One of the main results of this paper is to demonstrate how the Townsend-Singleton truncation
technique can lead to spurious results.
While couched within the context of an asset pricing model, the techniques introduced here
contribute more broadly to the literature on solving dynamic models with asymmetric information.
This paper builds on the work of Sargent (1991), Kasa (2000), and Pearlman and Sargent (2005).
Sargent (1991) describes a method for computing equilibrium (vis-a´-vis Townsend’s partial reve-
lation approach) in which the state of the economy is never revealed to the agents. Kasa (2000)
demonstrates how the frequency domain significantly decreases the computational cost of Sargent’s
solution method. More recently, Pearlman and Sargent (2005) show that the signal extraction
problem of Townsend (1983) is not enough to preserve divergent beliefs when agents act rationally.
By defining a new state variable (the agent’s forecast error) and applying the recursive methods of
Pearlman, Currie, and Levine (1986), they show that every agent will make the same forecast in
equilibrium, thus eliminating the need to forecast the forecasts of others. However, these advance-
ments have all been made in the context of Townsend (1983), which is a special case due to the
unique structure of the model.4 But it has long been suspected that this conclusion applies more
generally to a broader class of models. Consider the concluding remarks of Singleton (1987),
“Another interesting finding is that the equilibrium prices for the models with disparate
information and partial, homogeneous information follow very similar time series prop-
erties. It remains to be seen whether this carries over to alternative parameterizations
and information structures. Based on the findings to date, however, it appears that
disparate information per se in a competitive market does not significantly effect the
equilibrium price process.”
The contribution of this paper is to show how a certain class of signal extraction problems does
not generate and preserve divergent beliefs in a dynamic equilibrium when agents can learn from
past forecast errors. While this has long been believed to be true, no formal analysis to date has
proven this claim. Working within the framework of Singleton’s bond market model, I use frequency
domain techniques to show how endogenous variables reveal all privately held information. This,
in turn, eliminates the need to forecast the forecasts of others and the asymmetric information
“equilibrium” will be shown to converge to a symmetric information equilibrium. The proof of the
convergence result assumes that agents are equipped with basic econometric knowledge. The results
3More recently, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004) use Townsend’s truncation technique to analyze exchange rate
dynamics.
4The model of Townsend induces informational asymmetries by assuming that prices do not simultaneously clear
markets due to production lags. Thus the resulting signal extraction problem is endemic to the economy (see, Kasa
(2000)) and is unlike the “typical” signal extraction problem (i.e., where there are more noises than signals).
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derived here have implications for static models of asymmetric information, models that assume
agents have limited information capacity, and models that use the Townsend-Singleton truncation
technique.
The next section introduces the bond market model of Singleton (1987). Section 3 provides a
solution method for dynamic models of asymmetric information, solves the model in a symmetric
information setting and in an asymmetric information environment, and proves that these two
information structures yield the same equilibrium.
2 The Model
In this section, I briefly outline the model of Singleton, which was motivated by the market mi-
crostructure of the U.S. bond market.5 The basic features of the model include a competitive,
Walrasian market structure with a single asset that is traded among speculative and nonspecula-
tive or liquidity traders.
Suppose there is a continuum of investors indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and each trader invests in a
single risky security with price pt and stochastic coupon payment ct at date t. The coupon stream
{ct} is assumed to be normally distributed and to follow a first-order autoregressive process
ct = c¯+ ψct−1 + ut, E(ut) = 0, var(ut) = σ
2
u, |ψ| < 1.
Purchases of the security are financed by borrowing at the constant rate r. Therefore, the wealth
of trader i evolves according to
wi,t+1 = zit(pt+1 + ct+1)− (1 + r)(zitpt − wit),
where zit denotes the holdings of the risky asset at date t. The ith investor is assumed to have
a one-period investment horizon and to rank alternative investment strategies according to the
negative-exponential utility function
E
i
t − exp(−γwi,t+1),
where Eit denotes the expectation of investor i conditioned on his information set Ω
i
t at date t,
and γ is the constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion that is common to all traders. Given the
assumption that underlying sources of uncertainty are normally distributed, it is well known that
wealth maximization implies the following demand schedule for the risky asset
zit =
E
i
t(pt+1 + ct+1)− αpt
γδi
(2.1)
5The literature has shown a renewed interest in Singleton (1987) due to the work of Morris and Shin (2003) and
Allen, Morris, and Shin (2005). The Allen-Morris-Shin framework is a static, three-period asset pricing model. The
techniques of Singleton (1987) can be used to extend the Allen-Morris-Shin setup to an infinite horizon economy.
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where δi = var
i
t(pt+1 + ct+1) and α = (1 + r) > 1. It is the presence of higher-order moments δi
that lead to multiple equilibria. Since the goal of this paper is to keep track of how information
disseminates through asset prices, I will normalize the coefficient of risk aversion and the variance
parameter to unity. The resulting demand schedule
zit = E
i
t(pt+1 + ct+1)− αpt (2.2)
not only offers a unique equilibrium, but also has a broad appeal in that there are many economic
models that have equations analogous to that of (2.2). For example, with ct+1 defined as dividends,
we have a present value model for stock prices; with ct+1 defined as the difference between national
money supplies and income levels, it becomes the monetary model of exchange rates; with ct+1
defined as a short-term interest rate, it becomes the expectations hypothesis of the term structure;
and so on. Appendix A solves the model without this simplifying assumption.
Singleton assumed supply of the asset was stochastic and determined by nonspeculative traders,
which serves to break the no-trade theorem. That is, the net supply of the asset st (total supply less
nonspeculative demand at time t, less the mean difference) is the sum of two stochastic components
and price
st = A(L)ε1t +B(L)ε2t + ξpt (2.3)
where A(L) and B(L) are (possibly infinite-order) polynomials in nonnegative powers of the lag op-
erator L with square-summable coefficients (i.e.,
∑∞
j=0 A
2
j <∞), and {ε1t} and {ε2t} are mutually
and serially uncorrelated, normally distributed random variables with zero mean and variance com-
ponents σ2ε1, σ
2
ε2.
6 The net supply is interpreted as arising from non-speculative traders in the U.S.
bond market (e.g., the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, financial intermediaries). The shocks to
net supply could thus arise from non-speculative traders attempting to satisfy “macroeconomic”
objectives and for technical reasons related to the financial intermediation process. Non-speculative
traders are assumed to respond positively to an increase in price; thus, following Singleton, I will
assume ξ > 1.
The market clearing condition equates equations (2.2) and (2.3), and gives the equilibrium price
to be
ϕpt =
∫ 1
0
E
i
tpt+1di+ c¯+ ψct − st (2.4)
where ϕ = (ξ + α) > 1. Thus, the equilibrium price of the asset at time t depends upon the
market-wide average expectation of the asset at t+1.7 However, each trader’s forecast of pt+1 will
depend upon the market-wide forecast of pt+2, and so on, ad infinitum. If traders’ information sets
6Equation (2.3) places no restrictions on the serial correlation properties of {st}. The Wold Decomposition
Theorem allows for such a general structure (see, Sargent (1987)).
7Notice that equation (2.4) does not imply asymmetric information with respect to the coupon stream. The
argument is that asymmetric information in the U.S. bond market would arise with respect to the supply process.
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generate disparate expectations, the problem of infinite regress arises. When forecasting pt+1, each
trader must take into account every other traders’ forecast of pt+1, pt+2, · · · . If the equilibrium price
does not reveal all privately held information, then the usual method of solving for the rational
expectations equilibrium (e.g., Blanchard and Kahn (1980)) breaks down.8 The principal technical
difficulty is that agents are extracting signals from endogenous variables. When endogenous vari-
ables convey information, it becomes difficult to identify a tractable set of state variables because
an agent’s notion of the state of the economy would include other agents’ forecasts of the asset price
at indefinitely many future dates, thereby making the dimension of the state indefinitely large. In
contrast, for symmetric information, representative agent models involving signal extraction from
endogenous variables, the true state vector is latent from the optimizer. Beliefs then serve as the
defacto state variable (e.g., Muth (1960)), and the Kalman filter can be employed to estimate the
hidden state. But when the state becomes infinite dimensional, as it does here, this method cannot
be applied.
The next section describes two methods for handling the infinite-dimensional state space. One
solution method is the Townsend-Singleton truncation technique, which assumes that asymmet-
ric information only persists for a finite number of periods. The second solution technique uses
frequency domain methods to solve for equilibrium without relying on truncating the state space.
Following this solution method, one can then give conditions under which the equilibrium price
process contains too much information to preserve asymmetric information in equilibrium.
3 Information and Solution Techniques
In this section, I first describe the basic solution technique used to solve the model and do so under
the assumption of a homogenous information structure. I then give conditions under which the
asymmetric informational setup of Singleton converges to this homogenous, representative agent
economy. Finally, I demonstrate how the Townsend-Singleton truncation technique can lead to
substantial approximation error.
3.1 Solution Method
It is important to be meticulous about the conditioning information sets of agents in models of
asymmetric information, especially when information can be extracted from endogenous variables.
To place structure on the problem, solutions to the model will be sought in the space spanned
by square-summable linear combinations of the fundamental driving processes {ut, ε1t, ε2t}. This
assumption rules out sunspot equilibria and implies that the solution will lie in a well-known Hilbert
space (i.e., the space of square-summable sequences, denoted ℓ2(−∞,∞)). The information set of
agent i at time t, denoted by Ωit, represents the current and past values of the variables observed by
8Moreover, as recently emphasized by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2005), average expectation operators usually fail to
satisfy the law of iterated expectations. Therefore, in an economy with asymmetric information, the price of an asset
today will not equal the representative agent’s discounted expected value of the asset’s payoff stream conditional on
information available today, but the price will also encompass investors’ higher-order beliefs.
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trader i. There will be two types of information available to each agent – exogenous and endogenous.
Exogenous information is by definition not affected by market forces and will be denoted by U it .
Endogenous information may be generated through market interactions of differentially informed
agents.
Remark 1. Assuming all agents behave rationally, the Projection Theorem (see Brockwell and
Davis (1991)) implies that agent i’s conditional expectation of pt+1 is the orthogonal projection of
pt+1 on the smallest closed subspace which contains Ω
i
t. This subspace will include both exogenous
and endogenous information, and since the collection of variables is jointly normal, conditional
expectations will reduce to linear least-squares projections. Let Hx(t) denote the space spanned by
square-summable linear combinations of current and past values of x. Then trader i’s expectation
of pt+1 is given by
E
i
t(pt+1) = Π[pt+1|Ω
i
t] = Π[pt+1|U
i
t
∨
Hp(t)] (3.1)
where Π denotes linear least-squares projection and U it
∨
Hp(t) is standard notation for the “linear
space spanned by U it and Hp(t).”
Agents use all exogenous information and information generated by current and past values of
the equilibrium price in evaluating the expectation of tomorrow’s price. The expectation of investor
i is then simply the orthogonal projection of pt+1 onto the subspace generated by U
i
t and Hp(t).
Let Ξt denote the set of information known by all traders at date t (i.e., Ξt ≡
⋃
iΩ
i
t). We are now
ready to define a rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
Definition 1. A rational expectations equilibrium is a stochastic process for {pt}, pt ∈ Ξt, that
satisfies market clearing (2.4), where expectations are formed according to (3.1).
The requirement, pt ∈ Ξt, is what Futia (1981) referred to as the axiom of “no divine revelation.”
This condition prevents equilibrium prices at date t from conveying any more information than that
which could be in principle be available to traders at date t. In a symmetric equilibrium, agents’
expectations coincide:
Definition 2. We say a REE is symmetric if after observing the history of equilibrium prices
{pt−j}
∞
j=0 all traders have identical information and make the same forecasts. That is
E
i
t(pt+1) = Π[pt+1|U
i
t
∨
Hp(t)] = E
j
t(pt+1) = Π[pt+1|U
j
t
∨
Hp(t)]
for all i and j.
The equilibrium of the model is computed as follows. First, each trader uses all available
information at time t (Ωit) to form beliefs about the current price process. Second, the conditional
expectation of pt+1 will be taken via Wiener-Kolmogorov optimal prediction formulas. Third, the
appropriate form of equation (2.4) is then used to impose market clearing. In solving the subsequent
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fixed-point problem, I will appeal to the Riesz-Fischer Theorem and derive the solution in the
frequency domain.9 The benefit of working in the frequency domain is computational convenience.
Working in the time domain, Sargent (1991) shows how to convert the infinite dimensional state
space associated with the forecasting the forecasts of others problem of Townsend (1983) into a
finite dimensional system. Rather than guessing an infinite-order autoregressive representation for
beliefs (the state variable), Sargent models agents as forecasting by fitting low-order autoregressive,
moving-average (ARMA) representations. By introducing moving-average components in agents’
perceptions, Sargent utilizes the ability of low-order ARMA representations to replicate the space
of some infinite-order AR representations. The drawback of this approach is that not only does
one have to solve a fixed point problem in the coefficients of the ARMA process, but the order
of the ARMA process must be matched as well. This led to the insight of Kasa (2000), who
shows how this two-step process can be condensed into a single step by working in the frequency
domain. As opposed to guessing a functional form for beliefs, applying the Kalman filter, and then
attempting to match coefficients, the frequency domain allows one to work with a functional fixed
point problem. Therefore coefficients and order of the ARMA process are matched simultaneously
by using the theory of the residue calculus. However, this process will only generate a candidate
equilibrium price process. Traders will surely condition on past prices, therefore in order for the
information structure to preserve disparate expectations, the equilibrium price process must not
reveal other agents’ privately held information. In a sense, we must have an “informational fixed
point” in order for the price process to be sustainable in equilibrium. If the candidate equilibrium
price does reveal information to agents that they did not have in forming expectations at step one,
then the process just described will be repeated with the updated information sets of the traders.
It is this final step of the solution method that is the main contribution of the paper.
3.2 Homogenous Information
As a baseline model, it is useful to first assume a symmetric information structure that avoids
infinite regress.10 To this end, suppose that every investor observes past prices, the coupon stream,
and net supplies. That is, the common information set of every trader i is given by
Ωit = {pt−j , ct−j , st−j : j ≥ 0} ∀ i.
Given this informational assumption, an investor’s belief about the average equilibrium price will
be represented by a linear combination of current and past values of {pt, ct, st}. In the absence
of sunspots, these stochastic processes will be driven by the underlying shocks {ut, ε1t, ε2t}. For
reasons outlined in Whiteman (1983), it is much simpler to calculate equilibrium prices and quanti-
9Recall the Riesz-Fischer Theorem states there is an equivalence (i.e., an isometric isomorphism) between the
space of square-summable sequences denoted by ℓ2(−∞,∞) and the space of square integrable functions, L
2[π,−π];
the former is referred to as the time domain and the latter the frequency domain.
10This case will not only serve as a benchmark but the next section shows how ex ante disparate information
structures can degenerate to this homogeneous information case.
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ties if agents’ expectations are computed under the assumption that they can see these underlying
shocks. This “candidate” equilibrium will be realizable if and only if the space spanned by cur-
rent and past values of the candidate processes {ct, st, pt} is identical to that spanned by current
and past values of the underlying shocks {ut, ε1t, ε2t}. Therefore, trader i’s expectation of pt+1 is
assumed to be given by
E
i
t(pt+1) = Π[pt+1|Hs(t)
∨
Hp(t)
∨
Hc(t)] = Π[pt+1|Hu(t)
∨
Hε1(t)
∨
Hε2(t)]. (3.2)
Thus we proceed by assuming agents see the economic shocks, compute a candidate equilibrium
under that assumption, and then check to verify that the candidate equilibrium process {ct, st, pt}
would enable agents to uncover {ut, ε1t, ε2t}. If this recovery is possible, then the corresponding
equilibrium is a rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
Thus, step one of the solution process suggests we begin with the tentative assumption that
every trader believes the average equilibrium price to be given by
pt =
∞∑
j=0
Gj ut−j +
∞∑
j=0
Dj ε1,t−j +
∞∑
j=0
Fj ε2,t−j ≡ G(L)ut +D(L)ε1t + F (L)ε2t (3.3)
where G(L), D(L), and F (L) are (possibly) infinite-order square summable polynomials in the
lag operator L.11 The second step in the solution method is to calculate the Wiener-Kolmogorov
optimal prediction formula, which yield the conditional expectations12
E
i
t(pt+1) = L
−1[G(L) −G0]ut + L
−1[D(L)−D0]ε1t + L
−1[F (L) − F0]ε2t
Et(ct+1) = L
−1[C(L)− C0]ut.
Imposing market clearing (2.4) and rearranging, one obtains
ϕpt =
∫ 1
0
Et(pt+1 + ct+1)di− st
ϕ[G(L)ut +D(L)ε1t + F (L)ε2t] = L
−1[G(L) −G0]ut + L
−1[D(L)−D0]ε1t
+L−1[F (L)− F0]ε2t + L
−1[C(L)− C0]ut − [A(L)ε1t +B(L)ε2t].
The third step of the solution process is to solve the corresponding fixed point problem in the
frequency domain. As mentioned above, this is simply for computational convenience. Assuming
that this expression holds for all realizations of ut, ε1t and ε2t, the coefficients on us, ε1s and
ε2s must match for every s. In lieu of solving this infinite sequential problem, one can solve an
11It is important to note that by working in the frequency domain one does not have to take a stance on the explicit
functional form of beliefs, G(L), D(L) and F (L). This is especially convenient when beliefs contain moving average
components because MA representations are difficult to handle in the time domain.
12Note that we can write the demeaned coupon process as ct = C(L)ut where C(L) = (1− ψL)
−1.
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equivalent functional problem by examining the corresponding power series equalities
ϕG(z) = z−1[G(z) −G0] + z
−1[C(z)− C0]
ϕD(z) = z−1[D(z)−D0]−A(z),
ϕF (z) = z−1[F (z)− F0]−B(z).
Finding the appropriate functionsG(z), D(z), and F (z) in the frequency domain yields the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. The candidate equilibrium price is unique and given by
pt =
[
LA(L)− ϕ−1A(ϕ−1)
1− ϕL
]
ε1t +
[
LB(L)− ϕ−1B(ϕ−1)
1− ϕL
]
ε2t +
[
C(ϕ−1)− C(L)
1− ϕL
]
ut, (3.4)
Proof. Due to the symmetry of the problem and the assumption that the shocks are not correlated,
we can focus on solving the fixed-point problem for one process, say ε1t. A little algebra gives
D(z)(1 − ϕz) = D0 + zA(z).
As mentioned above, solutions to the model will be sought in the space spanned by square summable
linear combinations of the underlying fundamental shocks, and thus it must be the case that the
coefficients Dj are square summable. The requirement of square-summability in the time domain
corresponds to the requirement that D(z) be analytic on the open unit disk |z| < 1 in the frequency
domain. Given ϕ > 1, this function will not be analytic unless the free parameter D0 removes the
singularity at z = ϕ−1. This is achieved by setting the residue equal to zero and solving for D0,
which yields
lim
z→ϕ−1
D(z)(1 − ϕz) = D0 + ϕ
−1A(ϕ−1) = 0
D0 = −ϕ
−1A(ϕ−1).
This implies D(z) is unique and given by
D(z)∗ =
zA(z) − ϕ−1A(ϕ−1)
(1− ϕz)
(3.5)
and thus the candidate equilibrium price process has the form (3.4).
The candidate equilibrium price involves three instances of the prediction formula of Hansen and
Sargent (1980), and notice that equations (3.5) and (3.4) specify the candidate equilibrium as
a function of the fundamental processes of the model. These cross-equation restrictions are the
hallmark of rational expectations models.
The fourth and final step in the solution procedure is to determine whether the ex ante infor-
mational assumptions support such a price process. To do so, we construct the observer system
9
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for agent i, which includes all of the conditioning variables on the left hand side and fundamental
shocks on the right hand side. Setting this system up for the symmetric case one obtains,


ct
st
pt

 =


C(L) 0 0
0 A(L) B(L)
C(ϕ−1)−C(L)
1−ϕL
LA(L)−ϕ−1A(ϕ−1)
1−ϕL
LB(L)−ϕ−1B(ϕ−1)
1−ϕL




ut
ε1t
ε2t


or more compactly
yt =M(L)ǫt. (3.6)
If this system is invertible in nonnegative powers of L, so that ǫt may be obtained as a square-
summable linear combination of current and past yt, then (3.6) is a REE. This suggests that if
agents are equipped with basic multivariate statistical analysis (e.g., VAR analysis), then knowledge
of yt is equivalent to knowledge of ǫt.
In order to proceed, we need to place more structure on the model; anticipating analysis below,
we follow Singleton in the specification:13
Assumption 1. The supply and coupon processes are given by:
C(L) =
1
(1− ψL)
, A(L) =
1
(1− ρL)
, B(L) = 1 + ςL, 0 ≤ |ψ|, |ρ|, |ς| ≤ 1
Note that under this assumption, supply is the sum of a first-order autoregression (AR(1)) and a
first-order moving average (MA(1)). Depending on the relative sizes of σ2ε1 and σ
2
ε2 and whether ρ
and ς are nonzero, this is general enough to include the following special cases for the univariate
representation of supply: white noise, MA(1), AR(1) (in the limit as σ2ε2/σ
2
ε1 → ∞), ARMA(1,1)
and ARMA(2,1). It is now possible to determine conditions for the invertibility of (3.6).
Lemma 1. The vector moving average representation (3.6) is invertible (making (3.4) a REE)
provided
∣∣∣∣ αςρα(ρ− ς) + ςρ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1. (3.7)
Proof. A necessary and sufficient condition for (3.6) to be a fundamental (Wold) representation for
[ct, st, pt]
′ and thus invertible, is that the determinant ofM(z) be analytic and have no zeros inside
the open unit disk. By direct calculation,
det M(z) = C(z)
[
A(z)[zB(z) − α−1B(α−1)]
(1− αz)
−
B(z)[zA(z) − α−1A(α−1)]
(1− αz)
]
= 0
=
α−2[α(ρ− ς) + ςρ+ αςρz]
(α− ρ)(1− ρz)
; (3.8)
13The model was also solved with A(L) = 1 + φL. Adopting a different representation for A(L) will alter the
solution of the model slightly but the main results found here continue to hold given |φ| < 1.
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the stated condition guarantees that det M(z) does not contain any zeros inside the unit circle,
and therefore (3.6) is invertible.14
Invertibility makes (3.6) a fundamental (Wold) representation. This is important because it
implies M(L) has a one-sided inverse in nonnegative powers of L, so a corollary of the above
lemma is that Hc(t)
∨
Hs(t)
∨
Hp(t) ≡ Hu(t)
∨
Hε1(t)
∨
Hε2(t). Thus, the observables ct, st and
pt span the same linear space as the underlying fundamental shocks ut, ε1t and ε2t, and therefore
the Hilbert spaces generated by {yt,yt−1,yt−2, ...} and {ǫt, ǫt−1, ǫt−2, ...} must be identical (in
mean-square sense). Thus, the equality
E
i
t(pt+1) = Π[pt+1|Hc(t)
∨
Hp(t)
∨
Hs(t)] = Π[pt+1|Hu(t)
∨
Hε1(t)
∨
Hε2(t)] (3.9)
holds for all i. By allowing traders to guess an equilibrium price that is a linear combination of
the underlying shocks (3.3), equality (3.9) was implicitly assumed to hold. This suggests, and was
subsequently proven, that by observing the combination of the history of the coupon process, net
supplies and equilibrium prices and having knowledge of VAR analysis, agents would be able to
infer the underlying shocks. Of course this relationship does not have to hold in equilibrium. The
next section studies whether disparate expectations are preserved in this setup under Singleton’s
(1987) information structure.
3.3 Asymmetric Information
Following the framework of the U.S. bond market, in which there is little uncertainty concerning the
coupon stream, Singleton introduced asymmetric information via the supply process.15 Suppose
there are two distinct groups of traders, in proportion k and (1−k). Traders are not able to observe
net supply directly, but every trader receives a private, noisy signal on A(L)ε1t and a public signal
on B(L)ε2t.
16 Denote the two signals by
vit = A(L)ε1t + ηit, vt = B(L)ε2t
where ηit is assumed to be i.i.d, normally distributed with finite variance and is uncorrelated with
all other shocks. Not only will each individual trader receive different realizations of η, but the two
groups of traders differ in their qualities of information. Traders in group 1 (in proportion k) see
private signals with smaller variance (σ2η1 < σ
2
η2). Of course agents will also be able to condition
14Notice that if ς = 0, representation (3.6) will always be invertible.
15It is important to note that the main results of the paper continue to hold if asymmetric information is introduced
via the dividend stream, as is typically the case.
16Assuming traders observe a public signal does not imply that traders observe contemporaneous realizations of
the shock ε2t. The assumption of a public signal on ε2 is driven by the Singleton-Townsend truncation technique,
which assumes all traders observe ε2 with a two-period lag. The results of this section would continue to hold even
if B(L) = Ln, where n is a finite integer.
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on current and past prices, and the information set of agent i at time t is given by
Ωit = {ct−j , vt−j , vit−j , pt−j : j ≥ 0}. (3.10)
The central question is, will this heterogenous information be enough to generate and preserve
disparate expectations in equilibrium? The exogenous information structure is asymmetric; each
investor receives a different realization of ηt and the two groups receive different qualities of infor-
mation on average. However, in equilibrium, each trader will also extract information from current
and past prices. If the equilibrium price provides a rich enough information structure to bridge the
gap among traders, then the equilibrium will degenerate into the one studied in Section 3.2
The difference between this section and the previous section is that the agents must first solve
the signal extraction problem, which relates the signals to the underlying shocks. After solving this
problem, agents will then use this information to generate a guess of the equilibrium price process.
Consider the following signal system for agent i,
[
vit
vt
]
=
[
A(L) 1 0
0 0 B(L)
]
ε1t
ηit
ε2t


or more compactly,
vt = H(L)νt. (3.11)
Since there are more shocks than observables, agent i will not be able to “see” or infer both
economically fundamental shocks (ε1t, ε2t). This implies, a priori, that a relationship analogous to
(3.9) will not hold. That is,
Eit(pt+1) = Π[pt+1|Hc(t)
∨
Hvi(t)
∨
Hv(t)] 6= Π[pt+1|Hu(t)
∨
Hε1(t)
∨
Hε2(t)]. (3.12)
So what will the agents be able to infer? To give a concrete example, I adopt Assumption 1 and
seek a fundamental representation to replace (3.11). The fundamental representation will then be
used by the traders to form a guess of the equilibrium price. The following proposition finds the
unique fundamental representation to replace (3.11)
Lemma 2. The fundamental signal system for agent i in group k is given by
[
vit
vt
]
=
[
J1(L) 0
0 B(L)
][
ξit
ε2t
]
(3.13)
where J1(L) =
1−λ1L
1−ρL
Proof. We seek a fundamental (Wold) representation for the private signal (vit)– call it J1(L)ξit.
This is accomplished by factorization of the covariance generating function of the private signal,
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which is given by17
gvi(z) =
σ2ε1
(1− ρz)(1 − ρz−1)
+ σ2η1 .
In establishing a fundamental representation, we seek a λ1 and σ
2
ξ1
such that
σ2ε1 + σ
2
η1(1− ρz)(1 − ρz
−1) = σ2ξ1(1− λ1z)(1 − λ1z
−1).
Setting λ1 equal to the smaller root ensures |λ1| < 1 and yields
18
λ1 =
1
2
[(
σ2ε1
σ2η1ρ
)
+
(
1
ρ
+ ρ
)
−
{[
σ2ε1
σ2η1ρ
+
(
1
ρ
+ ρ
)]2
− 4
}1/2]
.
The variance σ2ξ1 is then found by the formula
σ2ξ1 =
gz(1)
J1(1)2
=
σ2ε1 + σ
2
η1(1− ρ)
2
(1− λ1)2
.
Note that Type 2 investors will have an analogous fundamental representation J2(L)ξit with λ2
and σ2ξ2 each a function of σ
2
η2 .
This factorization puts the signal in a form that the agents can use to predict next period’s
price and it also tells us the relationship between the signals and the fundamental shocks. By
construction, (3.13) a fundamental (Wold) representation and can now be used to generate trader
i’s guess of the equilibrium price.
Corollary 1. Trader i’s belief of the current price is given by
pt = Di(L)ξit + F (L)ε2t +G(L)ut (3.14)
where ξit is related to the underlying shock ε1t by the equation
ξit = J1(L)
−1A(L)ε1t + J1(L)
−1ηit =
ε1t
1− λ1L
+
1− ρL
1− λ1L
ηit. (3.15)
Note that as the signal-to-noise ratio (σε1/σηj ) approaches infinity, λj approaches zero and the
first component of (3.15) approaches ε1t. Conversely as the signal-to-noise ratio approaches zero,
λj approaches ρ. Therefore traders in group 1, who receive a more precise signal, will have a
more accurate guess of the price process on average. Further, because the entire price sequence
is observable in equilibrium, in order that agents have perceptions about the serial correlation
17See Whittle (1983) or Sargent (1987) Chapter XI Section 18.
18This also ensures ξit lies in the linear space spanned by current and lagged vit’s. In other words, that ξit is the
one step ahead prediction error of predicting vit from its own past, ξit = Π(vit|vit−1, vit−2, ...); and therefore the
Hilbert spaces generated by {vit, vit−1, ...} and {ξit, ξit−1, ...} are equivalent.
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properties of prices that are consistent with what is observed, the Di(L) functions must be identical
within groups and proportional across groups:
for i ≤ k : Di(L) = χ1D(L), for k ≤ i : Di(L) = χ2D(L).
Still, this information setup implies disparate expectations for every i
E
i
t(pt+1) = Π[pt+1|Hc(t)
∨
Hvi(t)
∨
Hv(t)] = Π[pt+1|Hu(t)
∨
Hξi(t)
∨
Hε2(t)].
In particular, for i ≤ k,
E
i
tpt+1 = L
−1[D(L)−D0]χ1ξit + L
−1[F (L)− F0]ε2t + L
−1[G(L)−G0]ut.
Given that the ηit’s are i.i.d., I will assume that a version of the strong law of large numbers
holds for each of the two groups so that the overall impact of the idiosyncratic shocks averages to
zero. That is,
E1t pt+1 ≡
∫ k
0
E
i
tpt+1di = kL
−1[D(L)−D0]ξ1t + kL
−1[F (L)− F0]ε2t + kL
−1[G(L)−G0]ut
where
ξ1t = χ1
∫ k
0
ξitdi =
χ1ε1t
(1− λ1L)
and analogously for k ≤ i ≤ 1. This assumption will not by itself lead to a symmetric REE
because the traders have different qualities of information (σ2η1 < σ
2
η2) which implies ξ1 6= ξ2. It
is important to note that χ1 > χ2 and λ1 < λ2 implies traders of group 1 have more accurate
perceptions and therefore smaller one-step-ahead forecast errors. Thus heterogenous information
and disparate expectations now exists across the two groups,
E
1
t (pt+1) = Π[pt+1|Hξ1(t)
∨
Hε2(t)
∨
Hu(t)] 6= E
2
t (pt+1) = Π[pt+1|Hξ2(t)
∨
Hε2(t)
∨
Hu(t)].
(3.16)
Because the idiosyncratic information integrates out, the equilibrium price will be a linear function
of ε1t. Thus, pt = D(L)ε1t + F (L)ε2t +G(L)ut, and χ1 and χ2 solve
σ2ε1 = χ
2
1σ
2
ξ1 = χ
2
2σ
2
ξ2
i.e.,
χ1 =
(
σ2ε1(1− λ1)
2
σ2ε1 + σ
2
η1(1− ρ)
2
)1/2
χ2 =
(
σ2ε1(1− λ2)
2
σ2ε1 + σ
2
η2(1− ρ)
2
)1/2
.
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It is straightforward to verify that if pt is of the form D(L)ε1t+F (L)ε2t+G(L)ut, then the average
forecast errors pt+1 − E
1
tpt+1 and pt+1 − E
2
tpt+1 are serially correlated. More troubling is the fact
that individual forecast errors are also serially correlated. If this serial correlation can be exploited
to improve predictions (as will be shown), perceptions (e.g., (3.14)) will not match reality, and we
will not have a REE. The extent to which this additional information generated by the candidate
price process can be exploited is the crux of the issue. Letting i and j denote the two groups of
traders, the market clearing condition is
ϕpt =
∫ k
0
E
i
t(pt+1 + ct+1)di +
∫ 1
k
E
j
t(pt+1 + ct+1)dj − st (3.17)
ϕ[D(L)ε1t + F (L)ε2t +G(L)ut] = kL
−1[D(L)−D0]
ε1tχ1
1− λ1L
+ (1− k)L−1[D(L)−D0]
ε1tχ2
1− λ2L
+L−1[F (L)− F0]ε2t + L
−1[G(L) −G0]ut + L
−1[C(L)− C0]ut −A(L)ε1t −B(L)ε2t.
It is easy to see that the solution for F (z) and G(z) will be the same as the symmetric case;
specifically,
F (z)∗ =
zB(z)− ϕ−1B(ϕ−1)
1− ϕz
G(z)∗ =
C(ϕ−1)− C(z)
1− ϕz
.
The third step of the solution procedure is to equate coefficients on ε1t, ε1t−1, ..., which yields the
power series equality
D(z)[−λ1λ2ϕz
3 + (λ2 + λ1)ϕz
2 − ((1− k)λ1χ2 + λ2χ1k + ϕ)z + kχ1 + (1− k)χ2]
= D0[(1 − λ2z)kχ1 + (1− λ1z)(1− k)χ2] + z(1 − λ1z)(1 − λ2z)A(z).
The roots of the cubic equation
−λ1λ2ϕz
3 + (λ2 + λ1)ϕz
2 − (λ2χ1k + (1− k)λ1χ2 + ϕ)z + kχ1 + (1− k)χ2 (3.18)
will determine the uniqueness of the candidate equilibrium encountered. The following proposition
shows that for the supply process given by Assumption 1 and assuming the sum of the gross interest
rate and supply response exceeds unity (ϕ = ξ + α > 1), there is a unique candidate price.
Proposition 2. Given ϕ > 1 and Assumption 1, the price process generated by information (3.10)
and the market clearing condition (3.17) is unique.
Proof. See Appendix B
In order for the equilibrium price to be unique, we need exactly one root of (3.18) to lie inside the
unit circle. If no root lies inside the unit circle, then the free parameter D0 will not be pinned down
and D(z) will not be unique. If more than one root lies inside the unit circle, a square-summable
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D(z) satisfying (3.18) does not exist. The proof found in Appendix B shows that there exists
exactly one root that lies inside the unit circle. Let θ denote this root. Then D0 will be set to
remove this singularity as before; in this case we have
D∗0 = −
θ(1− λ1θ)(1− λ2θ)A(θ)
(1− λ2θ)kχ1 + (1− λ1θ)(1− k)χ2
.
Substituting D∗0 into D(z)
D(z)[−λ1λ2ϕz
3 + (λ2 + λ1)ϕz
2 − ((1− k)λ1χ2 + λ2χ1k + ϕ)z + kχ1 + (1− k)χ2]
=
−(θ(1− λ1θ)(1− λ2θ)A(θ))[(1− λ2z)kχ1 + (1− λ1z)(1 − k)χ2]
((1− λ2θ)kχ1 + (1− λ1θ)(1− k)χ2)
+ z(1− λ1z)(1− λ2z)A(z)
(3.19)
or more compactly
D(L)∗ε1t =
[
D∗0[(1 − λ2L)kχ1 + (1− λ1L)(1 − k)χ2] + L(1− λ1L)(1− λ2L)A(L)
−λ1λ2ϕL3 + (λ2 + λ1)ϕL2 − ((1− k)λ1χ2 + λ2χ1k + ϕ)L+ kχ1 + (1− k)χ2
]
ε1t.
We now have our unique candidate equilibrium price process,
pt = D(L)
∗ε1t + F (L)
∗ε2t +G(L)
∗ut (3.20)
and we can construct the post-equilibrium observer system for a trader i:


ct
vit
vt
pt

 =


C(L) 0 0 0
0 A(L) 0 1
0 0 B(L) 0
G(L)∗ D(L)∗ F (L)∗ 0




ut
ε1t
ε2t
ηit


v′t = H(L)ǫt (3.21)
Representation (3.21) corresponds to the information available to trader i at time t, Ωit. If (3.21)
is a fundamental (Wold) representation, then the Hilbert spaces spanned by {v′t,v
′
t−1, ...} and
{ǫt, ǫt−1, ...} are equivalent, and every trader will be able to infer the shock ε1t by observing the
price sequence. In other words, even though we assumed (at (3.14)) that agents saw only a noisy
signal on ε1t when forming expectations, the market interactions of those agents injects enough
information into the price to reveal the underlying ε1t process. Thus after conditioning on the
current price, every investor will have identical forecasts in equilibrium. This leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, the candidate price process (3.20) reveals the current and
past realizations of the fundamental shocks {ε1t}, {ε2t} and {ut} to all traders.
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Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B. The intuition is as follows.
Following Lemma 1, in order to prove that (3.21) is fundamental and reveals ut, ε1t and ε2t,
we must show that the determinant of H(z) has no zeros inside the unit circle. This implies that
traders equipped with VAR analysis will be able to figure out the underlying economic shocks of
the economy. Recall B(z) = 1+ ςz where |ς| < 1. By direct calculation, the numerator of det H(z)
is
−(1 + ςz)(z − θ)[Qz2 −Rz + S]
where
Q = λ1λ2[kχ1(1− λ2θ) + χ2(1− k)(1 − λ1θ)](1− θρ)
R = (1− λ1θ)(1− λ2θ)[kχ1λ2 + (1− k)χ2λ1] + (1− θρ)[kχ1λ1(1− λ2θ) + (1− k)χ2λ2(1− λ1θ)]
S = (1− λ1θ)(1− λ2θ)[kχ1 + (1− k)χ2].
The determinant of H(z) has four zeros. The root z = θ is by construction (recall D∗0 was set to
ensure such a numerator zero would cancel the like term in the denominator of D(z)) and the root
z = −ψ−1 lies outside the unit circle. Therefore, the roots of
Qz2 +Rz + S (3.22)
determine whether or not representation (3.21) is a fundamental (Wold) moving average. Appendix
B shows that for ϕ > 1 there exists no roots that lie inside the unit circle.
The upshot is simply that the assumption of asymmetric information is not sustainable in
equilibrium. Traders will surely condition on past prices and update their forecasts accordingly.
Showing (3.21) is a fundamental representation is tantamount to the argument that all traders will
guess a price process of the form
pt = D(L)ε1t + F (L)ε2t +G(L)ut.
And therefore the idiosyncratic shock will not enter the average traders’ perceptions. More impor-
tantly, the conditional expectation (3.12) will be replaced by
Eit(pt+1) = Π[pt+1|Hε1(t)
∨
Hε2(t)
∨
Hu(t)]. (3.23)
All traders will share the same forecast! Hence there is no need to forecast the forecasts of others.
This economy will then degenerate into the one studied in Section 3.2.
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3.4 Townsend-Singleton Truncation Technique
The results derived here shed light on the consequences of the truncation approach of Townsend
(1983) and Singleton (1987), who assumed the equilibrium would preserve disparate expectations
and allowed traders to see the fundamental shocks with a two-period lag, that is {ε1,t−2, ε1,t−3, ...}
and {ε2,t−2, ε2,t−3, ...}.
19 Therefore instead of matching the entire sequence for D(z) and F (z), the
truncation approach requires that one match only a handful of coefficients, namely D0,D1, F0 and
F1. This, however, only approximates the actual equilibrium. To see this more clearly, note that
the privately held information of each trader under this informational assumption is given by


ε1,t−2
ε2,t−2
vit

 =


L2 0 0
0 L2 0
A(L) 0 1




ε1t
ε2t
ηit


xt = N (L)ǫt (3.24)
The above representation is not a fundamental one due to the zero in the determinant of N (L) at
L = 0; therefore traders will not be able to infer the economically fundamental shocks ε1t and ε2t.
This signal extraction problem is slightly different from the one encountered in the previous section
and is an artifact of the truncation approach. In order to obtain a fundamental representation, we
must employ Blaschke matrices (see Hansen and Sargent (1991)). The following lemma shows how
Blaschke matrices are used to derive the fundamental representation.
Lemma 3. The fundamental representation of (3.24) is given by
xt = N
∗(L)ǫ∗t (3.25)
where
N ∗(L) = Nˆ (L)WB(L), ǫ∗t = B(L
−1)W′ǫt
Mˆ(L) =


L2σε1 0 0
0 L2σε2 0
A(L)σε1 0 σηj

 W =


−
σηj
q
A2
0
σ2ε1+σ
2
ηj
0
σ2ε1A0
q
A2
0
σ2ε1+σ
2
ηj
0 1 0
σ2ε1A0
q
A2
0
σ2ε1+σ
2
ηj
0
σηj
q
A2
0
σ2ε1+σ
2
ηj

 B(L) =


L−2 0 0
0 L−2 0
0 0 1


and j = 1, 2 denoting the two distinct groups of traders.
Proof. See Appendix B.
19It is assumed that every trader can observe the entire sequence of {ut}.
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Thus the fundamental innovations (ǫ∗t ) implied by this truncation approach are linear combi-
nations of all the underlying shocks, including the idiosyncratic shock ηit. It is obvious, due to the
law of large numbers, that the market-wide average of the equilibrium price will not include ηit.
However the expectations will continue to be disparate across the two groups due to the presence
of the variance of η in W. Therefore when solving for the undetermined coefficients, the solution
will slightly differ from the symmetric information equilibrium (3.4).
Comparing the informational assumption of (3.24) with that of Section 3.3, Equation (3.11)
implies less information in that investors are not able to see ε1t with a two-period lag.
20 In fact, the
only information given to traders concerning ε1t is that which can be extracted from the signal vit.
However, through the information contained in the candidate price process pt, it was shown that
investors actually had the information set of {ε1t, ε1,t−1, ...} and {ε2t, ε2,t−1, ...}, the equilibrium
derived in Section 3.1. Therefore assuming that investors could only condition on {ε1,t−2, ...} and
{ε2,t−2, ...} only approximated the actual symmetric equilibrium. Indeed, when traders see {pt} in
addition to (3.25), then all underlying uncertainty about the fundamental shocks is revealed.
4 Conclusion
It seems doubtful that the bulk of fluctuations in asset markets is due primarily to differences in
risk tolerance. A more likely alternative is that trade is generated by agents who are endowed with
different sets of information. Unfortunately, tractable models of heterogenous information in a dy-
namic setting are difficult to construct and even more difficult to sustain in equilibrium. This paper
has demonstrated explicitly how endogenous variables reveal the privately held information of other
agents in a dynamic asset pricing model. It was shown, via frequency domain techniques, that the
invertibility of the post-equilibrium observer system corresponds to the revelation of economically
fundamental shocks. Traders equipped with basic statistical analysis can then condition upon this
“new” information and update their forecasts accordingly. Solution techniques and informational
constructs previously believed to maintain asymmetric information were shown in fact to lead to
revealing equilibria. The information content of the price process was too rich to sustain disparate
information in equilibrium.
An obvious extension of this research is to develop a dynamic rational expectations model that
preserves asymmetric information. To that end, Kasa, Walker, and Whiteman (2006) show how
this can be achieved in the frequency domain by assuming a special information structure that gives
rise to zeros in the post-equilibrium observer equations. These zeros prohibit equilibrium prices
from revealing the economically fundamental shocks. Woodford (2003) achieves this goal in the
time domain by following Sims (2001) in assuming that agents have limited capacity. That these
efforts seem to require very special circumstances to preserve differential information in equilibrium
when disparate expectations seem so widespread, suggests that models of asymmetric information
will constitute a fruitful area of research for some time to come.
20The public signal vt could have been lagged by two periods with no change in the fundamental result. This is
because all asymmetric information arises from the private signal.
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Appendix A: Equilibrium Multiplicity
Recall the following demand schedule for the risky asset
zit =
E
i
t(pt+1 + ct+1)− αpt
γδi
(4.1)
where δi = var
i
t(pt+1 + ct+1) and α = (1 + r) > 1. This appendix shows how the conditional variance term
δ leads to multiple equilibria and the conditions under which the results of Section 3.3 continue to hold. To
shorten the length of this appendix, I will assume that supply is given by: st = A(L)ε1t, and that traders
see only the private signal and the coupon stream, Ωti = {vit−j , ct−j : j > 0}. Adding the second component
of the supply process does not change the results qualitatively.
Consider the same informational setup of as before with the signal system for agent i < k given by
[
vit
ct
]
=
[
J1(L) 0
0 C(L)
] [
ξit
ut
]
Invoking Assumption 1 implies the derivations follow exactly as in Section 3.3, with the only difference
being the addition of the conditional variance term, δ. Given that agents initially only condition on the
information extracted from signals and that they are able to match the serial correlation properties of the
actual price process (pt = D(L)ε1t +G(L)ut), the conditional variance terms will be identical across groups
in equilibrium, i.e.,
δ = vart(pt+1) + vart(ct+1) + 2covt(pt+1, ct+1)
= D20σ
2
ε1
+ (G0 + C0)
2σ2u.
The corresponding market-clearing condition is given by
ϕpt =
∫ k
0
E
i
t(pt+1 + ct+1)di+
∫ 1
k
E
j
t (pt+1 + ct+1)dj − δγst
ϕ[D(L)ε1t +G(L)ut] = kL
−1[D(L)−D0]
ε1tχ1
1− λ1L
+ (1 − k)L−1[D(L)−D0]
ε1tχ2
1− λ2L
+L−1[G(L)−G0]ut + L
−1[C(L)− C0]ut − δγA(L)ε1t
where now ϕ = [γδξ + α] > 1. As before, both D(z) and G(z) must be analytic on the unit disk for all
realizations of ε1t and ut, but the inclusion of the conditional variance has linked the two power series, which
can be seen by rearranging and expanding the conditional variance term,
D(z)[−λ1λ2ϕz
3 + (λ2 + λ1)ϕz
2 − ((1 − k)λ1χ2 + λ2χ1k + ϕ)z + kχ1 + (1− k)χ2]
= D0[(1 − λ2z)kχ1 + (1 − λ1z)(1− k)χ2] + z(1− λ1z)(1− λ2z)γ[D
2
0σ
2
ε1
+ (G0 + C0)
2σ2u]A(z) (4.2)
G(z)(1 − ϕz) = G0 + C0 − C(z) (4.3)
There exists a potential pole at z = |ϕ−1| < 1 in (4.3) unless the free parameter G0 is set to remove the
singularity. That is, G0 = C(ϕ
−1)−C0 and G∗(z) =
C(ϕ−1)−C(z)
1−ϕz . The root condition for uniqueness in (4.2)
continues to be identical to the previous section (Equation (3.18)), and we know that there exists exactly
one root (θ) that lies inside the unit circle. Then as before, D0 must be set to remove the singularity at
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z = θ. Thus we have
D0[(1 − λ1θ)(1 − k)χ2 + (1− λ2θ)kχ1] + [D
2
0σ
2
ε1
+ C(ϕ−1)2σ2u]γA(θ)θ(1 − λ1θ)(1 − λ2θ) = 0 (4.4)
Given that there are two roots that satisfy (4.4), there are exactly two equilibria. Moreover, the excess
‘noise’ associated with the stochastic coupon stream coupled with risk-averse investors severely diminishes
the probability of finding equilibria that are real valued. In order for D0 (and the corresponding price
process) to be real valued, restrictions must be placed on the parameter values. Removing uncertainty in
the coupon stream (σ2u = 0) yields two equilibria with
21
D∗0 =


− (1−λ1θ)(1−k)χ2+(1−λ2θ)kχ1
σ2ε1
γA(θ)θ(1−λ1θ)(1−λ2θ)
0
(4.5)
The second case implies pt = G
∗(L)ut for all t. However, if σ
2
u 6= 0, then, from the quadratic formula, a
necessary and sufficient condition for finding a real solution is given by the following restriction
σ2u ≤
[(1− λ1θ)(1− k)χ2 + (1− λ2θ)kχ1]2
4σ2ε1γ
2A(θ)2θ2(1− λ1θ)2(1− λ2θ)2C(ϕ−1)2
. (4.6)
Assuming σ2u satisfies the above restriction then the number of roots in D0 satisfying (4.4) will be the
number of equilibria encountered. While the potential existence of multiple equilibria is disconcerting, we
are more concerned here with the revelation properties of the price process(es). The candidate equilibrium
price process(es) will be given by: pt = D(L)
∗ε1t +G(L)
∗ut, where
D(L)∗ =
D∗0 [(1− λ2L)kχ1 + (1− λ1L)(1− k)χ2] + L(1− λ1L)(1 − λ2L)γ(D
∗2
0 σ
2
ε1
+ C(ϕ−1)2σ2u)A(L)
−λ1λ2ϕL3 + (λ2 + λ1)ϕL2 − ((1− k)λ1χ2 + λ2χ1k + ϕ)L+ kχ1 + (1− k)χ2
(4.7)
G(L)∗ =
C(ϕ)−1 − C(L)
1− ϕL
The post-equilibrium observer system for trader i is then

vitct
pt

 =

 A(L) 0 10 C(L) 0
D(L)∗ G(L)∗ 0



ε1tut
ηit


xt = Q(L)ǫt (4.8)
As in the previous section, this observer system will reveal the underlying shocks ε1t and ut if (4.8) is a
fundamental Wold representation; that is, if the determinant of Q(L) does not contain any zeros inside the
unit circle. Assuming the minimum variance condition (4.6) is met with equality implies that there exists
exactly one root that solves (4.4),
D∗0 = −
(1− λ1θ)(1− k)χ2 + (1− λ2θ)kχ1
2σ2ε1γA(θ)θ(1 − λ1θ)(1 − λ2θ)
.
21Singleton(1987) found these equilibria numerically.
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The price process is therefore unique and given by
D(z)∗[−λ1λ2ϕz
3 + (λ2 + λ1)ϕz
2 − ((1 − k)λ1χ2 + λ2χ1k + ϕ)z + kχ1 + (1− k)χ2]
=
(1 − λ1θ)(1 − k)χ2 + (1− λ2θ)kχ1
2γθ2A(θ)(1 − λ1θ)2(1− λ2θ)2
[
z(1− λ1z)(1− λ2z)A(z)[(1− λ1θ)(1− k)χ2 + (1− λ2θ)kχ1]−
θ(1− λ1θ)(1 − λ2θ)A(θ)[(1 − λ1z)(1− k)χ2 + (1− λ2z)kχ1]
]
(4.9)
Comparing (4.9) with (3.19) it is easy to see how risk aversion enters the candidate equilibrium price process.
More importantly, it is easy to see that the zeros of (3.19) and (4.9) will coincide. In other words, the zeros
of the determinant of Q(L) are given by
detQ(L) = −D(L)∗C(L)
= −(1 + ψz)(z − θ)[Qz2 +Rz + S]
The exact condition for price revelation encountered in Section 3.3! Appendix B shows that there are no
zeros that lie inside the unit circle and therefore the price process will reveal all privately held information.
The equilibrium price of this economy is determined by a symmetric information structure. Moreover as σ2u
falls below the minimum variance condition (4.6), the economy converges to the candidate equilibria with
D∗0 given by (4.5). Using the techniques of this paper, it is easy to show that these candidate equilibria will
also reveal and degenerate into symmetric information equilibria.
Appendix B: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2
The following theorem will be used to show that two roots of (3.18) lie outside the unit circle with one real
root inside the unit circle (see, Churchill and Brown (1990)).22
Theorem A (Rouche´). Suppose that two functions f and g are analytic inside and on a simple closed
contour C. If |f(z)| > |g(z)| at each point on C, then the functions f(z) and f(z) + g(z) have the same
numbers of zeros, counting multiplicities, inside C.
To determine the number of roots of the cubic equation
−λ1λ2ϕz
3 + (λ2 + λ1)ϕz
2 − (λ2χ1k + (1− k)λ1χ2 + ϕ)z + kχ1 + (1− k)χ2 (4.10)
interior to the circle |z| = 1, rewrite (4.10) as
−a3z
3 + a2z
2 − a1z + a0
and define
f = −a1z + a0, g = −a3z
3 + a2z
2
22Thanks to Ken Kasa for suggesting Rouche´’s Theorem in proving Proposition 3.1.
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Notice that f has a (single) root inside the unit circle, since a1 > a0. To show this define ϑi = σε1/
√
σ2ε1 + σ
2
ηi
(1− ρ)2
and χi = ϑi(1 − λi) for i = 1, 2, and note
kχ1(1 − λ2) + (1− k)χ2(1− λ1) = (1− λ1)(1 − λ2)[kϑ1 + (1− k)ϑ2] < 1 < ϕ
Next, notice that |f | > |g| on |z| = 1; to wit, note that23
| − ϕ(1− λ1)(1 − λ2)| < ϕ < |(1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)[kϑ1 + (1− k)ϑ2]− 2ϕ|
implies
| − ϕ(1 − λ1)(1− λ2)| < |(1− λ1)(1 − λ2)[kϑ1 + (1− k)ϑ2]− 2ϕ|
which gives the result
| − ϕ(λ1λ2 − λ2 − λ1)| < |(1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)[kϑ1 + (1− k)ϑ2]− ϕ|
QED
Proof of Proposition 3
This section shows that the quadratic given by (3.22) has both roots outside of the unit circle. This implies
that the representation (3.21) is fundamental, hence eliminating the need to forecast the forecasts of others.
Recall the quadratic is given by
Y (z) = Qz2 −Rz + S
Q = λ1λ2[kχ1(1− λ2θ) + (1− k)χ2(1 − λ1θ)](1 − θρ)
R = (1− λ1θ)(1 − λ2θ)[kχ1λ2 + (1 − k)χ2λ1] + (1− θρ)[kχ1λ1(1− λ2θ) + (1− k)χ2λ2(1− λ1θ)]
S = (1− λ1θ)(1 − λ2θ)[kχ1 + (1− k)χ2]
First notice that Q, R and S are all strictly positive, implying that Y (0) > 0 and all the corresponding roots
must be strictly positive. Moreover Y (1) > 0; ignoring (1− k)χ2 terms (due to symmetry) yields
Y (1) = kχ1[λ1λ2(1− λ2θ)(1− θρ)− (1 − λ1θ)(1 − λ2θ)λ2 − (1− θρ)λ1(1− λ2θ) + (1− λ1θ)(1 − λ2θ)]
= kχ1(1 − λ2θ)(1 − λ2)[(1− λ1θ)− λ1(1− θρ)]
which is clearly positive because (1− λ1θ) > λ1(1− θρ).
We now need to rule out the case that both roots lie inside the unit circle. We do this by showing that the
minimum lies outside the unit circle.
z∗ = argmin Y (z) =
R
2Q
> 1
23It is interesting to note in passing that given λ1 = λ2 the above inequalities can be established via the unique
properties associated with the golden ratio (i.e., the positive number that solves the equation φ+ φ−1 = 1).
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Again focusing on kχ1, we need to show that
R − 2Q = kχ1λ2(1− λ1θ)(1 − λ2θ) + (1− θρ)kχ1λ1(1− λ2θ)− 2[λ1λ2kχ1(1− λ2θ)(1 − θρ)] > 0
= kχ1(1 − λ2θ){λ2[(1− λ1θ)− λ1(1− ρθ)] + (1− ρθ)λ1(1− λ2)}
which is clearly positive. QED
Proof of Lemma 3
Recall from (3.24) that the privately held information is given by the following system


ε1,t−2
ε2,t−2
vit

 =


L2 0 0
0 L2 0
A(L) 0 1




ε1t
ε2t
ηit


xt = N (L)ǫt
The covariance generating function of the above representation is given by
Gx(z) = N (z)ΣN (z
−1), Σ =


σ2ε1 0 0
0 σ2ε2 0
0 0 σ2ηj


where j = 1, 2 contingent upon the group of investor. Following Rozanov (1967), we can find an equivalent
(same covariance generating function) representation through the use of orthogonal matrices B(L) and W.
The corresponding fundamental representation is given by
xt = N
∗(L)ǫ∗t
where
N ∗(L) = Nˆ (L)WB(L), ǫ∗t = B(L
−1)W′ǫt
Nˆ (L) =


L2σε1 0 0
0 L2σε2 0
A(L)σε1 0 σηj

 W =


−
σηj
q
A2
0
σ2ε1
+σ2ηj
0
σ2ε1
A0
q
A2
0
σ2ε1
+σ2ηj
0 1 0
σ2ε1
A0
q
A2
0
σ2ε1
+σ2ηj
0
σηj
q
A2
0
σ2ε1
+σ2ηj

 B(L) =


L−2 0 0
0 L−2 0
0 0 1


The matrix B(L) is a Blaschke matrix that removes the root at zero by “flipping” the root outside the unit
circle, while the matrixW serves to ensure that the Blaschke matrix does not introduce any unwanted poles
into the fundamental representation.24 It is important to note that the orthogonal properties of the matrices
W and B(L) (i.e.,WW′ = I and B(z)B(z−1) = I) ensure that the fundamental representation continues to
emit the same covariance generating function. This representation is unique up to an orthogonal constant
and implies that investors will have knowledge of a linear combination of the innovations (ǫ∗t ).
24See Lippi and Reichlin (1994) for a good introduction to Blaschke matrices and fundamental representations.
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